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taxation in the housing markets 
 
Essi Eerola1 
April 2019 
 
Abstract: The recent financial crisis and subsequent global recession have been 
followed by a wave of macroprudential measures in the housing market. At the same 
time, governments have a long tradition of conducting tax policies which encourage 
households to acquire owner-housing. These tax advantages may be at least partly 
responsible for the need to regulate borrowing. In terms of policy, the goal should be to 
identify instruments that reduce the negative effects of household leverage while 
minimizing the welfare costs to households. Therefore, it seems important to look into 
the joint effects of the tax system and credit regulation.  
 
  
  
                                                          
1 VATT Institute for Economic Research, email: essi.eerola@vatt.fi.  
 
I wish to thank Anni Huhtala, Teemu Lyytikäinen, Niku Määttänen and Heidi Schauman for useful 
comments and discussions. All errors are my own. 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that high mortgage leverage is dangerous for macroeconomic 
stability. This is because in most countries a large share of household wealth is in the 
form of housing and house prices are very volatile.  As an example, the figure below 
shows price development in four Nordic countries where ownership rate varies between 
60% in Denmark and roughly 80% in Norway. 
   
Figure 1: Real house price index in Nordic countries (2015=100). Source: OECD 
House price indicators. 
 
 
Since the recent financial crisis and subsequent global recession, macroprudential 
measures aiming at reducing excessive household leverage and mitigating house price 
cycles have become common.2 For instance, 14 EU countries adopted some type of 
loan-to-value (LTV) limit between 2010 and 2016.3 The rationales are related to the 
existence of externalities, spillovers and contagion effects between different markets, 
in particular from the housing market to aggregate consumption.  
Financial stability need not be the only motivation for housing market macroprudential 
measures. Excessive household leverage may have adverse aggregate effects even if it 
does not threaten financial stability. When households are highly leveraged and most 
                                                          
2 See Crowe et al. (2013) for a discussion of the relationship between house price boom-bust periods and 
financial crises in various countries and the policy options, including monetary policy, fiscal policy and 
macroprudential policy. 
3 ESBR (2018) gives a detailed description of residential real estate instruments in Europe. BIS (2018) 
discusses the conceptual and practical issues related to implementation of macroprudential policies.  
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of their wealth is in the form of housing, a negative house price shock causes a large 
decline in household net wealth. This may induce highly leveraged households to 
reduce consumption and result in increased unemployment and recession or prolonged 
sluggish growth. This mechanism can be expected to be strong precisely when 
households do not default on their loans.4  
At the same time, governments have a long tradition in tax policies which encourage 
households to borrow in order to acquire owner-housing. These tax advantages have 
direct effects on the housing market. By creating incentives for acquiring owner-
housing even with large mortgages, the tax advantages may be partly responsible for 
the need to regulate borrowing.  
One possible reason for the sharp distinction between macroprudential measures and 
tax measures is institutional. Macroprudential policies are being conducted by financial 
supervisory bodies whose aim is to safeguard financial stability. Tax policies in turn 
are subject to approval by the parliaments where, among other things, the distributional 
effects of the tax reform proposals are subject to thorough discussion. This note argues 
that from the aggregate welfare perspective a more integrated approach would be 
useful.   
 
What do we know about the demand-side credit measures? 
 
Housing market specific macroprudential measures can be divided into supply-side 
policies aimed at banks and demand-side policies aimed at households. The demand 
side measures include different types of loan-to-value (LTV), debt-service-to-income 
(DSTI) and debt-to-income (DTI) rules, sometimes also maturity caps and amortization 
requirements. The effects of these types of measures operate through two different 
channels: First, they have a direct impact on borrowing and thereby housing demand of 
constrained households. Second, they shape house price expectations and thereby 
influence the demand for housing also for households that are not directly affected by 
the measures.  
Researchers studying the effects of these measures face several challenges. First, as the 
measures are typically implemented because of alarming housing market conditions, it 
is difficult to evaluate how the market would have evolved in the absence of the 
measures. Constructing such counterfactual is, nonetheless, necessary when assessing 
the effects of the measures. Second, the measures are often implemented in conjunction 
                                                          
4 For a general discussion of the recent US experience, see Mian and Sufi (2014).  
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with other policies which makes it difficult to isolate the effect of any given measure 
from other policy measures. Third, it is difficult to assess how important circumvention 
of measures is, be it credit expansion in less regulated financial institutions or 
manipulation of the rules. Finally, it may be difficult to assess the stringency of the 
measure especially without access to household level data revealing the distribution of 
leverage.5  
Most studies looking into the effects of the demand-side credit measures consider the 
measures as part of a broader setting where several different types of measures are 
studied across different countries using aggregate data.6  
When trying to understand the mechanisms and causal effects going beyond cross-
country analysis is needed. A recent example towards this direction is van Bekkum et 
al. (2019) who study the effects of an LTV limit in the Netherlands. As a first step, the 
authors show that the LTV limit indeed reduced mortgage leverage ratios and debt 
servicing cost among the affected homebuyers.  
In the second step, the authors focus on outcomes more directly relevant for household 
welfare. They conclude that the LTV limit reduced household liquidity in the short-run, 
led to fewer defaults but also reduced transitions from rental housing to owner-housing. 
The reduction in acquiring owner-housing was largest for the most financially-
constrained households. These results suggest that the LTV limit may have important 
distributional effects.7    
These results also hint towards more indirect effects in the housing market. For 
instance, if low-income buyers withdraw from the housing market due to the LTV limit, 
sellers of certain types of houses may face difficulties in finding a trading partner. In 
the presence of matching frictions, an LTV limit reduces housing market liquidity and 
may therefore lead to larger idiosyncratic price dispersion and longer time-on-the-
market (see, Eerola and Määttänen, 2018).  
 
What is the role of tax instruments?   
 
                                                          
5 Montalvo and Raya (2019) offer an interesting account of the Spanish experience where LTV ratio 
regulation was tied to appraisal values, not market values. Following LTV regulation, appraisal values 
were adjusted to the needs of the clients rather than trying to represent the value of the property. 
6 For a discussion of the literature, see Morgan et al. (2019).   
7 Carozzi (2019) also finds that especially transactions corresponding to cheaper housing units decreased 
markedly during the financial crisis in the UK. Tightening credit conditions is a likely explanation for 
this change. 
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In most OECD countries, owner-housing enjoys a tax favored status, mainly because 
the return to owner-housing, the imputed rental income, usually goes untaxed while the 
return to financial assets is taxed at a relatively high effective tax rate. In addition, 
realized capital gains from the sale of principal homes are often tax-exempt or taxation 
of gains can be deferred by reinvesting in another owner-house (Andrews, 2011). The 
literature studying the effects of the distortions created by such tax systems has shown 
that reforms abolishing the asymmetric tax treatment would lead to substantial 
efficiency gains (see e.g. Gervais, 2002).  
The inconsistencies in the taxation of owner-housing are also reflected in other typical 
features of the tax systems: Even if regarded as highly distortionary, housing 
transactions are typically subject to a transfer tax (for detailed discussion, see Mirrlees 
et al., 2011). Similarly, even if regarded as quite non-distortionary, property taxes 
appear to be small in most countries at least when assessed by their low revenue shares 
(Andrews et al., 2011).8 
Based on existing research it seems fair to say that transaction taxes and capital gains 
taxes induce sizable distortions to the housing markets. Both taxes increase the cost of 
moving, cause lock-in and reduce residential mobility.9  
Mortgage interest deductibility in turn lowers the user-cost of owner-housing and 
makes borrowing for owner-housing more attractive. Changes in deductibility tend to 
have a direct impact on household borrowing.10  
Less is known about the potential effects of taxation on price volatility and housing 
market liquidity. It is possible that housing transfer taxes and capital gains taxes reduce 
house price volatility by reducing speculative trading. On the other hand, high 
transaction costs may limit the use of arbitrage possibilities and increase price volatility. 
By increasing the cost of upgrading they also create an incentive to buy bigger houses 
and may thereby increase the leverage of especially young households.  
 
What about local conditions? 
 
                                                          
8 There may exist political economy reasons for favoring transfer taxes over property taxes (Määttänen 
and Terviö, 2018) and for favoring owner-housing over other assets (Eerola and Määttänen, 2006).  
9 For capital gains taxation, see Shan (2011). For housing transfer taxes, see Hilber and Lyytikäinen 
(2017).  
10 Gruber et al. (2018), Saarimaa (2010), Fjaerli (2004) find that in Denmark, Finland and Norway, 
respectively high-income households reduced mortgage borrowing after a reform which limited their 
possibilities to deduct mortgage interest payments compared to the control group unaffected by the 
reform. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) do not find the same for Italy. 
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The local housing market conditions ultimately determine whether the market adjusts 
to demand shocks through prices or supply. Especially in areas where housing supply 
is highly inelastic because of land use regulation or other supply constraints, one would 
expect changes in borrowing conditions, price of credit and taxation to capitalize into 
house prices. Consistent with this mechanism, Hilber and Turner (2014) find that in the 
UK mortgage interest deductibility has a positive impact on homeownership rates only 
in markets with lax land use regulation.  
Land use regulation itself also directly influences house prices. It is difficult to isolate 
the effects of regulation from other determinants of housing supply and prices. 
Nevertheless, there exists evidence suggesting that the land use regulation reduces the 
housing supply elasticity and increases house prices and volatility (see, e.g. Turner et 
al., 2014; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).   
The differences in local housing market conditions may be important in determining 
how dangerous household indebtedness is for financial stability. The reason is that high 
leverage relative to disposable income is especially problematic when house prices are 
increasing and volatile.11 In this situation, even a small negative house price shock 
causes a large decline in household net wealth.  
To make matters worse, in growing cities, agglomeration economies are likely to 
increase the value of land in central locations. Efficient land use policies may increase 
housing supply and thereby help reduce the consequent pressure on house prices. On 
the other hand, if urban planning is successful in making these central locations even 
more attractive, house prices can continue to increase despite increased supply.  
On the demand side, many tax instruments, macroprudential measures as well as 
interest rates are most likely relatively inefficient in addressing the differences in local 
housing market conditions. One potentially interesting exception is property taxation.  
In theory, future property tax liabilities affect negatively property values. Empirical 
studies that have been able to reliably separate the effect of property taxes from other 
factors influencing house prices (e.g. public services) have shown that property taxes 
are largely capitalized into house prices (see, Gallagher et al., 2013; Palmon and Smith, 
1998). Property taxes shift the timing of the costs of owner-housing: the up-front cost 
in the form of the transaction price is lower, but the subsequent annual cost is higher. 
Therefore, property taxes would directly reduce house price fluctuations relative to 
                                                          
11 This mechanism is explored, for instance, in Mian and Sufi (2011) who study the relationship between 
mortgage credit expansion and house prices in the US. See also Cloyne et al. (2018) who show that in 
the UK, when house prices increase, especially highly leveraged households increase borrowing by 
extracting equity from their home. 
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income or net wealth. Consequently, they could also mitigate the negative aggregate 
effects of house price fluctuations. 
What next?  
 
In terms of aggregate outcomes, measures aiming at reducing household leverage can 
be useful in two ways. Firstly, they may mitigate negative effects of a drastic reduction 
in private consumption due to a sudden fall in household net wealth. Secondly, they 
may protect banks from defaults or limit losses given default and thereby increase the 
stability of the banking system.  
The associated welfare losses for households come in the form of reduced possibilities 
to smooth consumption over the life-cycle and in reduced transition from renting to 
owner-housing. Through these effects regulating borrowing will have distributional 
effects which are largely ignored in the current debate on the relative merits of the 
different policy options. The welfare costs related to these measures are also amplified 
by the current tax advantages of owner-housing. 
Two separate but closely connected concerns regarding the tax favored status stand out. 
Firstly, it may be at least partly responsible for the need to regulate borrowing. 
Secondly, it may strengthen the negative distributional effects of macroprudential 
regulation if the borrowing constraints reduce the transition from rental housing to 
owner-housing.  
The overall goal should be to identify instruments that reduce the negative effects of 
household leverage while minimizing the welfare costs to households. Therefore, it 
seems important to move towards looking into the joint effects of the tax system and 
credit regulation and to take into account that risks related to high household leverage 
also depend on the local housing market conditions.  
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